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Consent, Informal Organization, and Job Rewards: a Mixed Methods Analysis*
MARTY LAUBACH, Marshall University
Abstract
This study uses a mixed methods approach to workplace dynamics. Ethnographic observations
show that the consent deal underlies an informal stratification that divides the workplace into an
“informal periphery,” a “conventional core,” and an “administrative clan.” The “consent deal”
is defined as an exchange of autonomy, voice, and schedule flexibility for intensified
commitment, and is modeled as a single factor underlying these elements. When constructed as
an additive scale, consent allows informal organization to be included in workplace models.
Despite its derivation from subjective and informal processes, informal structure exerts an
independent effect on objective job rewards such as wages.
* Thanks to Michael Wallace, Robert Althauser, David R. Heise, P. Christopher Earley, and J. Scott Long.
Appreciation is also extended to the Indiana University 1996 Social Research Practicum team who conducted the
Indiana Quality of Employment Survey, and to the many people still willing to respond to surveys. Direct
correspondence to Marty Laubach, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Marshall University, One John
Marshall Drive, Huntington, WV 25755-2678. E-mail: laubach@marshall.edu.

INTRODUCTION
The workplace is one of the most intensively studied areas in sociology, yet despite a century of
studying organizations, we still have only a vague understanding of the dynamics between
formal and informal organization, between structure and culture, and between objective and
subjective elements. We can enter a workplace and adjust to the culture, identify and work with
key informal power brokers, and manipulate that intersubjective dynamic which we know affects
workplace outcomes. However, we have yet to fulfill Gouldner’s (1959) call for reconciliation
between the “rational” and “natural system” models and develop a theoretical framework that
would move us from an understanding of the dynamics of a workplace to a generalized model of
the workplace. Without this general model, we can assert but not demonstrate claims such as that
the formal, structural side of the workplace has a minor role in determining workplace attitudes,
or that the informal dynamics has a measurable impact on objective outcomes.

This study is about measuring the effects of one important intersubjective dynamic that is
observable in the generalized workplace. I take a mixed methods approach: first using
ethnographic data to identify the elements of that dynamic, and then using survey data to model
it between the structural aspects and job rewards. This key dynamic creates an informal
stratification of workers into (a) an administrative clan: an elite group that works under
normative control and enjoys upper tier, primary labor market working relations; (b) a
conventional core: the majority of primary market workers who work under bureaucratic
conditions; and (c) an informal periphery: whose members work under the harshest “market”
relations with the strictest technical or personal control. I identify this dynamic as the “consent
deal” – an informal relationship between managers and workers that reflects the intensity by
which managers enforce formal work rules, and by which workers extend effort on workplace
tasks (see Littler and Salaman 1984). The intensity of this dynamic is measured as an exchange
of autonomy, schedule flexibility, and voice by managers for organizational commitment by
workers. For each worker, a high level of all elements indicates membership in the
administrative clan, and a low level of all indicates membership in the extended periphery.
Using these elements, I model the consent deal as a second-order latent factor, then construct
an additive scale and measure its distribution between formal workplace levels and occupation
types. Finally, I incorporate consent as a measure of the informal intersubjective dynamic within
a broader workplace model and test its effects relative to the effects of objective structural
factors on job satisfaction, worker identities, and wages.
CONSENT
Burawoy’s (1979) conception of workplace consent has been important to analyzing power
relations within the workplace. A number of ethnographies since have elaborated on how
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management generates consent and limits class consciousness (e.g., Hodson et al. 1994; McCabe
1999; Smith 1996). However, these have failed to offer a conception of consent that can be used
to broaden the research using statistical modeling. Indeed, studies that have used statistical
modeling have deviated from a relational definition in favor of worker-centered measures —
e.g., Vallas (1991) used worker perceptions indicative of class consciousness, and Hodson
(1999) used organizational citizenship and resistance behaviors.
A more useful approach was offered in Littler and Salaman’s (1984) discussion of control
and consent. They begin with the observation that the key factor in determining organizational
structure is the need to convert raw labor power to productive labor (Braverman 1974; Hache
1988), and that this is done through various labor control mechanisms (Edwards 1979). They
then echo Burawoy’s observation that some process to generate worker compliance must also be
designed into the organization of the work process. They recognize that while control is often
established through management’s work rules and procedures, these rules cannot realistically
account for all circumstances that arise in production. A normalized production flow therefore
requires some amount of give and take, such as bending rules for extra effort. In fact, workers
sometimes engage in a form of resistance called “working to rule” in which they refuse to
participate in this give and take, thereby slowing production. This requirement leads Littler and
Salaman to characterize real work behaviors and relationships as the result of continual
negotiations between workers and their immediate supervisors over interpretations of formal
work rules, a flexibility which is offered in exchange for a working commitment to the overall
objectives of management. Because this involves an effective suspension of the rules,
procedures, and regulations around which the formal organization is based, they conclude that
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consent is developed “outside formal organizational procedures for establishing legitimacy, in
what is described as the ‘informal’ structure of the organization” (1984:68).
INFORMAL ORGANIZATION
Organizational theorists since Roethlisberger and Dickson ([1939] 1967) have recognized that
informal organization rivals formal organization in its effect on the day-to-day functioning of an
enterprise. Subsequent theorists have discussed its importance for organizational dynamics (e.g.,
Burns and Stalker 1961; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Selznick 1949; Thompson 1967), and its
effect on enhancing or restricting productivity (e.g., Burawoy 1979; Graham 1971; Mayo 1933;
Reif et al. 1973; Roy 1959; Sayles 1963). However, despite this attention, there has been little
consensus on how informal organization manifests across organizations. While Roethlisberger
and Dickson describe informal organizations as the “actually existing patterns of human
interaction” by which the work of the organization is performed ([1939] 1967:559), others
characterize it in such terms as the “natural” v. “rational” system (e.g., Selznick 1949; Thompson
1967), “organic” v. “mechanic” model (Burns and Stalker 1961), “culture” (see Ouchi and
Wilkins 1985), “negotiated order” (Fine 1984), and “discourse” (Stinchcombe 1990), none of
which easily lend themselves to modeling. Lawrence and Seiler (1965:187) approach a usable
construction with their discussion of workers as having a “status,” which is determined by
“position in the informal social organization” but never specifies how that position was
determined. Without a clear specification, quantitative work on informal organization has not
advanced much beyond network analysis, which reduces it to the number and type of
communication links between workers (e.g., Mizruchi 1994; Podolny 1990; Vogel 1968;
Wellman and Berkowitz 1988;). This specification has obvious limitations for crossorganizational studies.
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Some characteristics of informal groups can be found in the literature. Gouldner (1959:410)
acknowledges the ambiguity regarding informal organization by describing it as “a residual or
cafeteria concept of diverse and sprawling contents.” He relates the “natural-systems model”
(which focuses on informal organization) with his earlier discussion (1954) of “representative
bureaucracy,” which he says has its basis in consent. He notes that consent springs from a
“consensus of ends and values” (1954:223), and that an important component is worker
perception of having “some measure of control over the initiation and administration of the
rules.” He also notes that “formal rules gave supervisors something with which they could
‘bargain’ in order to secure informal cooperation from workers” (1954:173) and identifies
schedule flexibility as an important bargaining “chip” for informal cooperation.
Other hints can be found in discussions of the informal coalitions that are found within
organizations. Thompson describes coalitions as workers who want to “maintain or enhance their
positions regardless of the official, authorized positions they hold” (1967:125), and who tend to
have high levels of discretion and some voice in enterprise decision-making processes. Similarly,
Pfeffer and Salancik’s coalitions consist of workers who are (1) involved in the “enactment of
the organization’s environment” — an essential part of decision-making, and (2) driven in part
by “the quest for discretion and autonomy” (1978:261).

OBSERVATIONS OF INFORMAL WORKPLACE STRATIFICATION
I observed informal stratification and the elements of consent that underlie it while conducting
ethnographic observations of Family Finance Corporation (FFC), a family-owned financial
enterprise that went public, overextended, and was absorbed by a larger corporation.1 These
observations were made while I worked over four years in several roles: a temporary employee
assigned to the company, a part-time computer programmer, a full-time administrator, and an
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outside consultant.2 Relevant observations are presented in summary form because the agreement
under which management allowed these observations excluded interviews or quotations
attributed to members of the workplace. Much of the data therefore consists of natural
conversations and incidents observed in the course of my duties. To underscore that people did
recognize my dual role as worker and observer, I was given the nickname of “the professor” by
my supervisor, and I encouraged its use among coworkers.
FFC had two periods with distinct cultures during the study, before and after its move to a
building constructed during its intensive growth phase. When I started, the culture was very
informal, with an “organic” management style (per Burns and Stalker 1961), and had working
relationships such that all levels of workers intermingled regularly and most people could be
expected to do any task. FFC’s main office was located in converted storefronts of a strip mall,
and there were no partitions between desks and few between functional areas. There were scores
of temporary workers throughout the offices helping with what turned out to be a disastrous
manual conversion of account records between computer systems, and these workers were often
treated as regular staff.
Just prior to the move to the new building, a new management team was recruited for
finance, information systems, and personnel functions, and the formation of this team coincided
with a change to a more formal, “mechanic” style. Working relationships became much more
formal and professionalized. Functional units were separated, workers were given cubicles,
managers were given offices, and security procedures were implemented to restrict access to the
building by non-employees. Hierarchical distance quickly appeared between management,
professionals, clerical staff, and temporary workers. The corporation appeared to objectify its
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new organizational stratification in the distribution of functional units by floor, which I have
depicted in Figure 1.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The move to the new building with offices, cubicles, and new furniture and equipment
signaled a change in culture away from the business’s earlier incarnation as an entrepreneurial
free-for-all to an established corporation. Workers seemed to take themselves more seriously by
dressing more formally and decorating their cubicles and offices in a more “professional” style.
The corporation took an active role in developing the culture by implementing a corporate
newsletter and staging occasional picnics and holiday parties. Functional units began developing
subcultures — traditions, languages, and social ties that build unit solidarity.
INFORMAL STRATFICATION
My duties included developing, installing, and troubleshooting computer systems, and these
responsibilities allowed me to travel to all social and physical levels of the new building where I
was able to observe the transformation in workplace relationships and attitudes. I could see that
the informal networks that developed prior to the move didn’t completely disappear, but
congealed into an informal administrative structure that appeared to shadow the formal structure.
I also noted the emergence of an informal polarization that had either been camouflaged or
minimized by the earlier culture. This polarization created three groups that were distinguishable,
but whose boundaries were continually in flux. I came to call these groups the informal
periphery, conventional core, and administrative clan. Their distribution within the building (and
among functional units) is depicted in the shaded areas in Figure 1.
Informal Periphery.
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The informal periphery was the “bottom” of the informal structure. Workers in this group
appeared to visibly manifest the dissolution of the boundary between temporary and permanent
workers described by Smith (1997). Many were either traditional contingent workers (temporary
or part-time workers) or permanent workers who were treated as contingent. Their work tasks
were well-defined and managerial control was intensive and often antagonistic, whether
conducted through direct attention from a supervisor or automated into the technology of their
work. These workers were generally given such highly routinized tasks that their contribution
came more from attendance than application of a skill set, a stark reality that was reflected in the
minimal schedule flexibility they received.
For many workers, this outsider status was temporary, until their general proficiency was
recognized to be sufficient to warrant more relaxed supervision or until they were able to
demonstrate some level of commitment or skill. However, there appeared to be some workers
who were consistently relegated to out-group status. Some of these were simply due to deficient
individual performance. Others were due to membership in a racial or ethnic minority or a
subordinate work group being assimilated through a merger. Still others simply worked in
positions which had experienced such high levels of turnover that incumbents needed to show
extraordinary patience or proficiency before any opportunity to improve their situation.
Workers in the informal periphery were rarely acknowledged by management, but when they
were they were usually referred to with terms that indicated unreliability and expendability. On
one instance when I was walking on the first floor with one of the higher level managers, he told
me that these workers were “clock watchers.” Many workers in the informal periphery responded
in kind to this treatment, showing low levels of dedication and sometimes evincing minor forms
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of resistance. For them, the enterprise represented an onerous work environment with few
redeeming features beyond a paycheck.
Conventional Core.
The majority of workers were in what I called the “conventional core.” These are the workers for
whom the formal organizational rules apply. Occupations in this group include everything from
clerical to management, but the worker-organization relationships tend to be dominated by
bureaucratic concerns. For example, these might be clerical or technical workers who are highly
committed, but their autonomy and other work conditions were no different from their less
committed colleagues as dictated by their formal position. Similarly, the core also included
professionals or managers whose position gave them very high levels of autonomy, schedule
flexibility, and input into the organization, but whose level of commitment — the alignment of
interests with the corporation — were relatively low in comparison to their peers.
Administrative Clan.
Soon after starting work, and despite my status as a temporary worker, my technical skills and
managerial background placed me in an informal technical-administrative group that cut across
the organization’s functional units and formal hierarchical structures. This group, which I titled
the “administrative clan” after Ouchi’s (1980) organization type, appeared to operate in the
manner of the “coalitions” described by Thompson (1967) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). It
centered around management and professional staff, but extended deep into the organization,
drawing in workers with critical institutional knowledge or idiosyncratic skills. The group often
appeared as a clique or “in-group” of workers at various levels through which the most critical
administrative activity seemed to flow. Membership was not necessarily commensurate with
structural factors such as formal hierarchical position, formal skill set, or tenure.
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There were numerous examples of offices in which workers would hold identical job
descriptions with the same formal authority, but only one worker would be recognized and
treated as part of the clan. Some clan members would have minor differentials in title from
workers who were otherwise their peers; however, these differentials apparently served only to
legitimize a greater reliance on the “other duties as assigned” clause of their formal job
description. One work unit that was given the title of “special projects” was staffed
predominantly with clerical clan members who would conduct high priority data entry (or data
clean-up) projects to assist any functional unit of the organization. Even this unit was stratified
among clerical clan who worked autonomously and clerical non-clan who were more closely
supervised.
As noted, identifying members of the clan was generally easy, but specifying characteristics
of membership was not. There were no set boundaries between members and non-members nor
were there designated rituals defining membership; people moved in and out of the group as their
proverbial “star” rose or fell. Membership appeared to take the form of an aura of reliability, as if
it had been confirmed by some ordeal. In many cases it had been — some members were known
for their willingness to put forth heroic efforts for critical projects, others for their ability to help
define or represent some important aspect of organizational culture. All were trusted workers
who knew how to manage critical tasks under minimal direction.
One characteristic that seemed important was engagement with corporate cultural activities
— regardless of the actual feelings the clan member had toward the activity. Clan members
would help plan and even bake special dishes for parties, read and even contribute to the
newsletter, and participate in a “vision committee” that appeared to be FFC’s equivalent to
quality circles.

Page 10

This reliability and trustworthiness appeared to reflect a sense that the heroic efforts of these
workers were motivated by a sincere concern for advancing FFC’s interest. Members had aligned
their interests so completely with the corporation that, for them, the typical control processes
were not necessary. This alignment closely resembled Ouchi’s (1979, 1980) clan organization
form, but unlike for Ouchi, the alignment applied to this informal group instead of to the
organization as a whole. Interestingly enough, my label for this group as the “administrative
clan” resonated well for coworkers with whom I discussed the validity of the concept.
WORKPLACE POLARITY
The administrative clan and informal periphery embody a number of workplace polarities.
Members of the administrative clan tend to be on the "fast track" for promotions, get the highest
raises, and have better ties with other supervisors and coworkers, while members of the informal
periphery are generally ignored. The correspondence between informal structure and flexibility
theory’s “core” and “periphery” (e.g., Berger and Piore 1980; McLoughlin and Clark 1988;
Osterman 1975; Piore 1971) became apparent in worker responses to staff cuts that were forced
by FFC’s financial troubles. The business had been closing branch offices for months with little
reaction from workers at headquarters because the enterprise was thought to be consolidating
work there. However, when almost all of the external branches were cut, headquarters
experienced two waves of layoffs. The first wave hit workers at all levels of the formal
organization, but was focused on members of the informal periphery. Although this wave
included some managers and professionals, survivors were clearly not concerned for their own
jobs. When asked about the layoffs of managers and professionals, they replied with statements
suggesting that management was merely “cutting dead weight.” However, when the second wave
of layoffs included administrative clan members (including myself), survivors displayed
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considerably more concern that the enterprise was in serious trouble and that their own jobs were
at risk. An organization that would cut clan members was now seen as being in deep trouble.
When I was brought back as a consultant, I was told that each unit was required to give up a staff
member, and that I was cut because of my dual commitment to FFC and to my academic
research.
In an interesting addendum to the layoffs, as if to underscore the contingent nature of the
extended periphery, FFC hired a new cohort of these workers within weeks after the layoffs.
When I asked why FFC was simultaneously hiring and laying off workers, Human Resources
staff indicated that turnover within these positions was so high that these positions were not
considered when making strategic staffing decisions for the enterprise.
CHARACTERISTICS OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION: THE CONSENT DEAL
Despite the three distinct informal strata I observed, there appeared to be an underlying
continuum that created “degrees” of clan and periphery as people moved into and out of those
groups. This continuum reflected varying levels of consent — a characteristic of the corporationemployee relationship indicating the level of active cooperation in the process of production.
However, within this context consent means much more — implying a level of engagement
between the worker and the corporation, or at least one of the organizational coalitions that
administer the corporation. At its high end this engagement means Ouchi’s clan relations, where
control is normative (e.g., Kunda 1992) and maximum effort is assumed, and at the low end the
lack of engagement means a relationship of suspicion, where control is technical or direct
(Edwards 1979), and supervision is close, leading to the “less reliable” worker performance
described by Gouldner (1954:161).
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This continuum of engagement is observable in what I refer to as the “consent deal,” based
on Littler and Salaman’s (1984) conceptualization of consent as an exchange of relaxed
enforcement of rules for alignment of interest. This takes the form of an exchange of perceived
autonomy, voice, and schedule flexibility for organizational commitment, and is as clearly visible
in the administrative clan as it is clearly absent in the extended periphery. Perhaps the most
important of these offerings from management is the perception of autonomy, which is regularly
brought up in the literature as a characteristic of desirable positions. In the administrative clan,
even members at non-professional, clerical support levels perceive themselves to have high
levels of autonomy more characteristic of professional positions. In the informal periphery, even
members of management are closely scrutinized.
The next offering from management is the perceived ability to participate in organizational
decisions. Administrative clan members, even from lower formal positions, perceive themselves
as influencing the corporation. This influence is not always direct, although they are sometimes
asked and are always listened to when offering an opinion. Administrative clan members are
aware that they exercise disproportionate influence indirectly by preparing formal reports and
participating in information channels which shape management’s conception of organizational
issues (i.e., Pfeffer and Salancik’s “enactment process”). On the other hand, periphery members
generally learn about decisions and sometimes even the problems they address as the decisions
are being implemented. In a more direct application of Hirshman’s (1970) terms, when problems
develop, clan members are more comfortable exercising “voice” while peripheral workers are
more likely to “exit.”
The third job characteristic in the consent deal is perceived schedule flexibility. For
administrative clan members, this often starts with their working long hours when they are called
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to help complete time-sensitive projects in exchange for “compensatory time off.” In many cases
this flexibility takes the form of clan members not observing strict time rules, as in arriving late
or leaving early. Often this flexibility is more perceptual than real, because their commitments as
administrative clan require face time at the workplace. This flexibility is best exemplified by a
clerical worker in my unit who often had problems finding daycare for her children, especially
when she was called in on her days off to work critical problems. She would occasionally bring
her children, and we would set up games on a computer to occupy them as she worked. We
would not even have considered this for someone who was not a clan member. My own schedule
is another example — I often came in late, but while I was occasionally teased, coworkers
recognized that I regularly worked at home. Members of the periphery, either because their
contribution comes more from their presence than their skills or because they are under intense
pressure from managers, have no such flexibility. If they were “clock watchers” as described by
managers, their tardiness and leaving early was being no less closely scrutinized by those same
managers.
The fourth characteristic, organizational commitment, is the employee’s contribution to the
consent deal. It is critical for clan membership and absent in the informal periphery.
Administrative clan members act as if their interests are fully aligned with the enterprise, and
give much of themselves to it, often to the detriment of their families and social life. This
commitment is regularly tested in extra responsibilities not associated with their formal job
duties. For instance, the Information Systems unit at FFC was also responsible for snow removal
and administering the building’s cleaning contracts. One clan member in that unit was severely
tested when he found that someone on the night shift had defecated on the floor of the executive
suites’ restroom. He accepted his responsibility to clean the restroom because the cleaning
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company could not be called before the executives came in for the day. The incident can also be
seen as expression of contempt from peripheral workers, who held the same low regard for the
corporation as they felt the business had for them.
The relative level of each of these of these components reflects the extent of the consent deal
being made at the individual level. All characteristics are present at high levels for members of
the administrative clan, and all are low or absent for the informal periphery. Workers with
mismatched or moderate levels are in the undifferentiated mass of the conventional core. A
professional or manager who has high levels of autonomy, voice and flexibility but does not
return high levels of commitment is not regarded as clan.3 At the other end, a temporary or entrylevel worker who works in a very restrictive job but demonstrates a high level of commitment
would not be regarded in the same way as members of the informal periphery, and would be
more likely to be advanced in formal position before others with more tenure.
This mismatch between the worker’s commitment and job characteristics offered informally
by management can be seen as indication of a boundary through which workers are moving into
and out of the clan or periphery. It also suggests that the direction of effects between job
characteristics and commitment actually goes back and forth over time. Workers demonstrating
higher commitment than their position warrants are sometimes informally extended greater
levels of autonomy, voice, and flexibility within their jobs, or might even be promoted to
positions with the commensurate characteristics. Perhaps the best example of this was the
Special Projects Unit, which offered clerical workers an “elite” status and very flexible work
rules for working on critical problems that required initiative and creativity.
On the other hand, workers at professional and managerial positions who do not demonstrate
commitment commensurate with the levels of autonomy, voice, and flexibility that comes with
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their positions often have those characteristics restricted. Three examples illustrate this point. In
the first case, a vice president who had been college friends of the president began making
greater demands of money and perks from the enterprise because of a successful project he had
initiated. When this did not come quickly, he was found to be secretly negotiating for a position
at a rival company. This act of disloyalty overcame his value to the organization so his
autonomy, flexibility, and authority were severely restricted until he left. In the second case, a
new set of managers from a conglomerate that took over the enterprise imposed the same
restrictions on the founder and president, and drove him out. Perhaps the best example was the
third case of an administrator who was part of the clan for much of the observation period, but
who lost status through his declining commitment. His personality was abrasive, and the
company moved away from the technology which was his specialty, but his early demonstrations
of commitment were sufficient to warrant clan status for most of his tenure. The action which
precipitated his fall from the clan and his subsequent dismissal was telling an assistant not to
perform some work requested of his unit.4 The words least compatible with clan status are the
following: “I won’t do that — it is not my job.”

THE CONSENT SCALE
The ethnography demonstrated that an informal structure that is important to organizational
dynamics is observable through the four elements of the consent deal: autonomy, voice, schedule
flexibility, and commitment. I next wondered if this informal workplace dynamic could be
observed more generally in statistical models constructed from survey data. This formulation
would allow me to test propositions about the relative effects on job rewards of this subjective
element and the more traditional structural elements used in workplace models. In the following,
I refer to this subjective element as either “consent” or “informal organization,” depending on
Page 16

the context, but it must be understood that since the consent deal underlies informal organization,
I regard them as analytically synonymous — dual sides of the same coin.
The procedure for modeling the consent scale is simple enough, but it first must face a
paradigmatic objection that the three elements of the consent deal which are generally regarded
as structural characteristics — autonomy, voice, and schedule flexibility — are well established
as causally prior to subjective states such as the third element — organizational commitment
(e.g., Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Mathieu and Zajac 1990; Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982).
This objection is met first by noting that some of the early proponents of structural analysis
recognized the subjective nature of these characteristics as outcomes of power struggles
(Kalleberg, Wallace, and Althauser 1981). Secondly, when obtained from surveys, these
characteristics are in reality self-reported subjective perceptions of an individual worker’s
situation. Hackman and Lawler (1971) demonstrated that these make good approximations5 for
objective structural characteristics, but they do not have the consistency or objectivity implied by
the paradigm. For example, a worker’s autonomy and schedule flexibility are vulnerable to
changes brought on by a change of managers. A job can be completely revamped and
incumbents “reined in” by a new manager without making any formal changes to job
descriptions or organizational charts. Self-reported job characteristics are also not objective
because, when asked to rate their level of autonomy, an administrative clan member in a clerical
position might offer the same responses as a manager, creating a perceptual equivalence that
belies the very real differences in autonomy between clerks and managers based on the
differences in their tasks.
Ultimately however, this paradigmatic concern about levels of causality is resolved by
modeling the consent deal as a latent factor operating at a level that is causally prior to and
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measured by all four subjective or perceptual characteristics — a relationship measured by
confirmatory factor analysis.
METHODS & DATA
The data set used in the model was collected as the Indiana Quality of Employment Survey
(Wallace, Jamison, and Shin 1996), which was conducted in the summer of 1996 using the
facilities of the Center for Survey Research at the Indiana University Institute for Social
Research. The IQES resulted in 705 completed cases (64 percent response rate) from across
Indiana selected randomly from working adults (defined as people over aged 18 working more
than 20 hours per week) employed in non-agriculture jobs. A randomizing procedure for
selecting respondents from households ensured against bias on the basis of who answered the
telephone. The questions used in constructing measures in this study are presented in Appendix
1, arranged by factors which they were initially designed to measure.
One note regarding sample size: because the dynamics of informal organization are different
for small organizations (< 10 workers), the model is restricted to organizations with 10 or more
workers. This reduced the sample size to 582.
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF CONSENT
Given that autonomy, schedule flexibility, and organizational commitment are themselves
measured as latent factors, consent is modeled as a second-order latent factor underlying these
first-order factors. Figure 2 depicts the model with parameter estimates. The number of cases for
this model is 557 due to listwise deletion of missing values. Estimates are computed by AMOS
3.62 using asymptotically distribution-free estimators to compensate for distribution problems
caused by categorical variables (see Bollen 1989; Kline 1998). The original model included
freedom as a third measure of autonomy (see Appendix 1), but that produced fit statistics which
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indicated that the model did not fit the data (2=51.2, df=32, p=.016). By dropping freedom, the
fit statistics supported the assertion that the revised model fits the data (2=21.2, df=24, p=0.63).
Even though this left two indicators for autonomy, the model is still identified per Kline
(1998:235). Cronbach’s coefficient (=.74) indicates that this is a reliable measure for consent.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION
A more useful form for consent is an additive scale in which the items are weighted by the paths
from the latent factor (see Figure 2). Heise and Bohrnstedt (1970) offer several statistics to test
the suitability of composite scales. With these data, their invalidity statistic for consent (>.01)
verifies that there is only one factor, their validity statistic (TS=.88) shows a high correlation
between the scale and the underlying factor, and along with their reliability statistic6 (= .80),
the use of the composite scale is supported.
The actual boundaries between informal periphery, conventional core, and administrative
clan are ill-defined and fluid, so consent really can be viewed as a continuous variable rather
than a categorical variable. However, for analyses in which the categories are important — such
as their relative proportions within workplace categories — a reasonable split can be made in
which the informal periphery consists of workers whose consent scores are more than a standard
deviation below the mean, and the administrative clan consists of workers whose consent score is
more than a standard deviation above the mean. Table 1 reports these distributions across formal
organizational positions, occupations, and profit status, and includes the F statistic which tests
for differences in means of the underlying consent score for each workplace category.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
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Panel A equates formal organization to Wright’s (1978) formulation of social classes,
effectively returning Wright’s formulation to its origin as stratification in the workplace. This
panel demonstrates a relationship between formal and informal organization roughly depicted in
Figure 1, where even workers at high formal positions have informal periphery-level consent
scores, and workers at the lowest formal levels can have administrative clan-level scores.
Managers and executives whose consent scores place them in the informal periphery might be
considered examples of Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan’s assertion that the failure rate among
executives is 50 percent and that the “base rate for managerial incompetence is between 60 and
70 percent” (1994:494). However, the basic trend in Panel A is the expected increase of the
proportion of clan at increasing levels of formal organization, and increasing proportion of
informal periphery at lower formal levels.
Panel B reports that the three occupations with the largest percentage of clan members are
managers, sales, and professionals, a result which demonstrates the importance of sales workers
to the informal administrative networking of the organization. The occupation types with the
lowest percentage of clan and highest percent periphery are laborers, office workers, service
workers, and technicians, a result which demonstrates that nonprofessional office workers (e.g.,
secretaries, receptionists, and account clerks) and technicians (e.g., legal assistants and licensed
practical nurses) now have lower standing than production workers.
Panel C reports that government and non-profit corporations have higher percentages of
workers in the informal periphery than for-profit corporations do. In addition, the government
has a lower percentage of people in the administrative clan, while non-profit enterprises have the
highest percentages of workers in the clan. This can be interpreted as supporting the assertion
that profit-producing organizations are more concerned with generating consent than government
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corporations, and that workers in not-for-profit corporations are highly polarized, but these ideas
need to be explored further.
MODELS OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION
The final step in this analysis is to construct a workplace model that includes the effects of
informal organization on job rewards. This model (Figure 3) draws conceptually on typical
models used for attitudinal studies (e.g., Leicht and Wallace 1994; Lincoln and Kelleberg 1990;
Mathieu and Zajac 1990), but differs in using the consent deal as a measure for position in the
informal structure of the workplace, placed causally between structural job characteristics and
outcomes.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The model starts with individual characteristics such as age, sex, race, education, and marital
status, and then adds the respondent’s workplace characteristics such as corporation size, scope
(local to international), organization type (i.e., government and non-for-profit corporation), and
the industry concentration by sales — one of Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) measures of the
effect of the corporation’s environment. These individual and organizational characteristics are
seen as influencing positional characteristics such as organizational tenure, union membership,
and formal position (using Wright’s categories in Appendix 1), and job characteristics such as
the level of technological change, the DOT thing score, and an objective complexity scale
constructed from the DOT data, people, and reasoning scores. The Heise-Bohrnstedt statistics
(<.001, TS=.91, = .83) support the use of this additive scale.7 All of these are modeled as
determinants of position in the informal organization, as measured by the consent deal, and the
results are reported in Table 2. The effects of formal position in the organization (Wright’s scale)
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are reported both for the individual strata and for all levels as a whole using a sheaf coefficient
(Heise 1972).
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Position in the informal organization appears to be primarily determined by objective job
characteristics, though with an R2 of only .25, the largest portion of the variance remains
unexplained by structural factors in the model. The strongest effect comes from position in the
formal organizational structure, followed by decreasing complexity in working on “things” and
increasing job complexity using the people, data, and reasoning scale. This negative effect of
working with things is especially interesting since the original conception of consent was
developed around workers in manufacturing industries (see Burawoy 1979; Littler and Salaman
1984). Other significant determinants are not working for the government, not being a union
member, and working at corporate headquarters instead of a branch. The initial effects of
education and being female appear to be mediated by organization and job characteristics, and
drop out in the final model. Age, race, and marital status appear to have no effect on informal
position, suggesting a somewhat meritocratic approach to informal stratification once formal
stratification is controlled.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In the extended model, informal position is included among the determinants for three
common work outcomes that are prominent in the literature: wages, job satisfaction, and worker
identity (often referred to as work commitment). These results are reported in Table 3, and
demonstrate that informal position exerts a strong effect on the job rewards tested in the model.
The model for wages is particularly interesting. One of the strongest effects on wages is that
of class, a finding that is well-documented in the literature (Wallace and Fullerton 2003;
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Wallace, Leicht, and Grant 1993; Wright and Perrone 1977). Table 3 demonstrates that the net
effect of informal organization is more than half the effect of formal organization. It is more than
the differential for age, working in a large organization, working in the private sector, and
working in a more highly concentrated industry, and is more than half the effect of union
membership. Again, with the controls for objective position and job characteristics, this effect on
one of the most visible and objective work outcomes can only be interpreted as a very real
manifestation of the informal and intersubjective side of the organization.
Position in the informal organization is the strongest factor influencing both the respondent’s
satisfaction with the job and subjective sense of identity as a worker. The results regarding job
satisfaction are interesting in that informal position dwarfs the only two other significant factors8
— being white and working for the government. In addition, none of the job characteristics
(complexity, thing score, technical change) contribute to satisfaction, a finding that suggests that
in an economy transitioning from production to service and office work, job satisfaction in large
organizations is derived more from informal workplace relationships, and is less intrinsic to the
type of work performed. However, with an R2= .29, it is clear that better structural characteristics
are needed. Finally, the results for worker identity demonstrate that there are relatively few
factors beyond informal position in this postindustrial era that make identity as a worker salient.

CONCLUSION
Consent, measured by the exchange of autonomy, voice, and schedule flexibility by employers
for organizational commitment by workers, creates an informal workplace stratification that
mirrors traditional stratifications based on structural factors. As a product of the intersubjective
world of the workplace, consent offers a finer resolution on the effects of the types of
experiences that affect workplace attitudes and behaviors than traditional objective structural
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measures. Created as a scale from survey data, it offers quantitative analysts an ability to study
this intersubjective world across workplaces in ways that complement the findings of
ethnographers and network analysts. This measure offers a large step in fulfilling Gouldner’s call
for reconciling the rational and natural systems models into a more powerful synthesis.
While the ethnographic data support the content validity of the scale and the HeiseBohrnstedt validity statistic demonstrates that the additive scale adequately measures the
underlying factor, determinations of construct validity can only be established through a process
described by Bollen as testing whether the measure “relates to other observed variables in a way
consistent with theoretically derived predictions” (1989:189). This study begins that process by
demonstrating that the distribution of informal periphery and clan among occupations and by
formal position complements, but does not duplicate formal structures. The workplace models
continue it by demonstrating that informal organization exerts a dominant influence on
subjective outcomes such as worker identity and job satisfaction, but also has an important
influence on objective outcomes such as wages.
The proposed measure of consent and the connection between consent and informal
organization is latent but not obvious in the workplace literature. Perhaps one of the virtues of
this analysis is that it adds no new measures to the already long list of variables available for
workplace studies. While it is no great news that some function of autonomy and commitment is
highly correlated with much of what sociologists find interesting in the workplace, this
repackaging of variables is an important reconceptualization of the workplace. It offers a
reduction and clarification of existing models, and an opportunity to revisit existing data sets as
well as develop additional new data to expand the study of consent and informal organization.
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Subsequent analysis using consent should focus on other attitudes, perceptions, behaviors,
and outcomes. Models that include informal organization could shed light on how the intermix of
subjective and structural factors influence perceptions of workplace relations, discrimination,
promotion and pay equity, as well as broader perceptions such as the meaningfulness of the job
and the rights of workers and management. Ultimately, it is hoped that this scale will round out
workplace models, and facilitate the study of how workplace relations transcend organizational
boundaries and affect worker attitudes on social factors not directly related to the workplace.
This study demonstrates the power of mixed methods research. Additional mixed methods
research should identify other informal dynamics that have clearly observable effects within the
overall workplace. Ethnographic observations of the workplace should include a search for
measures that can be used in surveys and a discussion of the dynamics that can guide the
construction of models by their more quantitative colleagues.

Notes
1. This study was conducted in accordance with procedures approved by the Bloomington
Campus Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects, Bryan Hall, Room 10a,
Bloomington, IN 47405-1219 under protocol #97-1509. A more detailed report of results is
still being compiled. Family Finance Corporation is a pseudonym.
2. Discussion offered in this study revolves around my observations at FFC, but is augmented
by years of observations during my prior career as a technician and manager of data
processing systems.
3. I note again that my conflicting commitments to research and to FFC became a consideration
in my getting laid off.
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4. The clan informants who related this story to me were shocked by it, treating it as an example
of despicable heresy.
5. Hackman and Lawler (1971) found high correlations between employee, supervisor, and
researcher ratings for job characteristics such as variety, autonomy, and task identity. This
has supported the use of worker perceptions as an approximation for objective measures.
6. These are computed using the communality and factor scores from SPSS’s Principle Axis
Factoring extraction method. Because Cronbach’s  is known to be a lower limit, Heise and
Bohrnstedt offer a more generalized reliability measure.
7. The regression weights are data=1.77, people=1.29, reasoning=0.96.
8. The significant result for supervisors should be seen in light of the lack of significance for
formal position as a whole.
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TABLE 1: Cross Tabulation of Combined Data for Informal Organization Groups by Formal
Structural Classifications, Occupations, and Organization Type.
informal conventional administrative
consent
Panel A. Class (per Wright)
periphery
core
clan cases
mean
Non-Autonomous Worker
23.7%
70.5%
5.8% 224 25.98
Semi-Autonomous Worker
11.9%
71.9%
16.3% 135 26.78
Front Line Supervisor
16.2%
71.6%
12.2%
74 29.39
Lower Manager
8.0%
64.8%
27.3%
88 31.24
Upper/Middle Manager
4.7%
58.1%
37.2%
43 33.38
Large Employer-Capitalist
.0%
38.9%
61.1%
18 37.05
15.5%
68.2%
16.3% 582 28.56
F statistic for means 23.53 **
df
5
Panel B. Occupation
Managers
Professionals
Technicians
Sales Workers
Office Workers
Service Worker
Production Worker
Laborer

informal conventional
periphery
core
6.3%
61.1%
14.3%
64.3%
15.4%
80.8%
6.5%
71.7%
20.2%
71.4%
18.7%
65.3%
9.9%
81.7%
26.7%
63.4%
15.5%
68.2%

administrative
consent
clan cases
mean
32.6%
95 32.69
21.4%
84 29.18
3.8%
26 25.88
21.7%
46 30.49
8.3%
84 26.91
16.0%
75 27.68
8.5%
71 28.39
9.9% 101 26.05
16.3% 582 28.56

F statistic for means
df
Panel C. Organization Type
Government (F,S,L)
Private Company
Not-for-profit

informal conventional
periphery
core
21.2%
68.7%
13.4%
70.3%
22.4%
49.0%
15.5%
68.2%

administrative
consent
clan cases
mean
10.1%
99 26.38
16.4% 434 28.93
28.6%
49 29.77
16.3% 582 28.56

F statistic for means
df
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9.85 **
7

6.47 **
2

TABLE 2: OLS Regressions of Informal Position on Individual, Organizational, Job
Characteristics and Formal Structural Position.
Formal
Full Models
Individual
Organization
Job
Position
Individual characteristics
Age (by category)
.04
.07
.02
.04
Female (=1)
–.09 *
–.08
–.12 **
–.07
White (=1)
.00
–.01
–.05
–.04
Education (by achievement)
.13 **
.15 **
.00
.02
Married (=1)
.02
.03
.01
.01
Organizational characteristics
Employer Size (by category)
.00
.02
.01
Organization branch (=1)
–.12 *
–.11 *
–.10 *
Not-for-profit (=1)
.02
.01
.00
Government (=1)
–.16 **
–.17 **
–.12 **
Industry concentration (by sales)
–.11 *
–.08
–.06
Position and job characteristics
Technical Change
.09 *
.06
Organization Tenure
.03
.00
Union Membership
–.11 *
–.10 *
Objective Complexity (a)
.28 **
.20 **
Occupational Things Score (a)
–.33 **
–.22 **
Formal position: Wright's class
Class: Large Employer (=1)
.17 **
Class: Large Manager (=1)
.17 **
Class: Small Manager (=1)
.18 **
Class: First Line Supervisor (=1)
.12 **
Class: Autonomous Worker (=1)
–.04
Class Sheaf Coefficient

.28 **

R-squared
.03
.09
.19
N = 549
Note: coefficients are standardized.
(a) From Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor).
(b) The reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; two tailed test

.25
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TABLE 3: OLS Regressions of Work Identity, Job Satisfaction, and Wages on Individual,
Organizational, and Position Characteristics.
Job
Work
Full Models
Wages
Satisfaction
Identity
Individual characteristics
Age (by category)
.10 **
.03
.06
Female (= 1)
–.32 **
.04
–.08
White (= 1)
.03
.10 **
–.01
Education (by achievement)
.22 **
.00
–.14 **
Married (= 1)
.07 *
–.01
–.09 *
Organizational characteristics
Employer Size (by category)
.10 **
–.02
–.12 *
Organization branch (= 1)
–.05
.00
–.06
Not-for-profit (= 1)
–.04
–.01
.06
Government (= 1)
–.10 **
.12 **
.05
Industry concentration (by sales)
.07 *
.04
–.01
Position and job characteristics
Technical Change
.04
.05
.10 *
Organization Tenure
.07
–.03
.05
Union Membership
.18 **
.01
.05
Objective Complexity (a)
.21 **
.08
.07
Occupational Things Score (a)
–.15 **
.04
–.03
Formal position: Wright's class
Class: Large Employer (= 1)
.20 **
–.06
.01
Class: Large Manager (= 1)
.11 **
–.06
.01
Class: Small Manager (= 1)
.09 *
–.09
.02
Class: First Line Supervisor (= 1)
.06
–.10 *
–.03
Class: Autonomous Worker (= 1)
.03
–.01
.08
Class Sheaf Coefficient
Informal position
Consent

.22 **

.13

.09

.13 **

.54 **

.22 **

R-squared
.56
.29
.14
N
517
543
543
Note: coefficients are standardized.
(a) From Dictionary of Occupational Titles (U.S. Department of Labor).
(b) The reference category for class is non-autonomous workers.
* p < .05; ** p < .01; two tailed test
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Appendix 1. Definitions of Variables.
Standard responses are 1 = strongly agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = somewhat disagree, and 4 =
strongly disagree, with “neither agree nor disagree” not prompted. These are recoded to reflect
higher levels of agreement and given a 1–5 scale, with “neither agree nor disagree” coded at 3.
Means, standard deviations, alphas are computed for organizations with more than 10 employees
and no missing values for consent scale.
Mean
Consent
(stdev)
Organizational
Agreement with statements (standard responses):
commitment
1. I am willing to work harder than I have to help my employer
4.42
(0.89)

succeed.

2. I am proud to be working for my employer.
3. I find that my values and my employer's values are very
similar.
Computed as mean score. Reliability  = .70
Autonomy

Agreement with statements (standard responses):

4.10
(.89)

2. It is basically my own responsibility to decide how my job
gets done.

3.64
(1.31)
4.25
(1.15)

3. My job gives me a lot of freedom about how I do my work
[this was dropped from full consent model].

3.97
(1.28)

Computed as mean score. Reliability  = .65

3.95
(.96)

1. I have a lot of say about what happens on my job.

Schedule
flexibility

4.23
(1.06)
3.65
(1.39)

Please tell me how much say you have in the following areas (1
= a lot of say, 2 = some say, 3 = none at all; reflected for higher
values to indicate greater say):
1. The days of the week you work.

2.60
(1.63)

2. The time of day you work.

2.67
(1.52)

3. The number of hours you work.

2.80
(1.53)

Computed as mean score. (Each item was adjusted such that 1 =
1, 2 = 3, and 3 = 5) Reliability  = .79

2.60
(1.63)
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Voice

Agreement with statements (standard responses):

Consent

My job does not allow me to participate in important decisions
that affect my organization. (Not reflected for higher values to
indicate greater participation)
Computed from confirmatory factor model path parameters as
consent =.4920 * workhard +.8369 * myvalues +.8457 *
iamproud +.9470 * sayhours + 1.0521 * saydays +.9309 *
saytime +.7640 * idecide + 1.4867 * lotofsay + 1.0000 *
partdecs. Reliability  = .74

Individual Characteristics

3.20
(1.49)

28.56
(6.76)

Age

Computed from year of birth.

Female

Dichotomous variable (Female = 1).

White

Computed as a dichotomous variable (white = 1) from a question
that offered a selection of racial groupings. The sample was
89.3% white.

Education

Asked as highest grade of school or level of education and
grouped by attainment (1 = high school, 2 = some college, 3 =
college degree and graduate work).

13.70
(2.27)

Married

Computed as a dichotomous variable (married = 1) from a
question that included living with a partner, widowed, divorced,
separated, and never married.

.60
(.49)

Organizational Characteristics
Employer size

How many people work for your employer at all locations? (1 =
1–9, 2 = 10–49, 3 = 50–99, 4 = 100–499, 5 = 500–999, 6 = 1000
–1999, and 7 = 2000+)

39.14
(11.8)
.47
(.5)
.88
(.33)

5.12
(1.94)

Note: Respondents were asked directly, but these categories
were offered if respondents did not provide an estimate. This
study recoded responses into categories. In 12 percent of the
cases the survey staff obtained organization size through outside
sources.
Works at branch Do you work in the main headquarters of is the main
headquarters was located elsewhere? (Branch = 1).

.56
(.5)

Not-for-profit

In your present job do you work for the government, a private
company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you selfemployed? (Not-for-profit = 1)

.09
(.28)

Government

In your present job do you work for the government, a private
company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you selfemployed? (Government = 1)

.17
(.38)
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Industry
concentration
by sales

Respondents were asked what kind of business or industry they
worked for, with a follow up question asking what product or
service the company provided. These were coded to the 1990
Industrial Classification System using the Alphabetical Index of
Industries and Occupations, published by the U.S. Department
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Industry environmental
data such as the concentration ratio in corporate sales were
appended by industry code based on data obtained from the IRS
Sourcebook: Statistics of Income, 1993. Corporate Income Tax
Returns. Missing values (i.e., from government organizations)
were recoded to the sample mean to ensure that the cases are not
excluded from the overall analysis but do not contribute to the
analysis of this factor.

Position and Job Characteristics
Technical
change

Since you began your present job, how much change has there
been in the technology you use on your job? (1 = very much, 2 =
some, 3 = not very much)

50.66
(28.03)

3.01
(.89)

An additional volunteered category of “none” was added and
responses were reflected to increase in value with increasing
change.
Organization
tenure

For about how long have you worked for your present
employer? Coded as years.

7.73
(9.09)

Union
membership

Do you currently belong to a union? (Union = 1)

.18
(.39)

Complexity
scale

Respondents were asked their job title what they did on their job.
These responses were coded using the 1990 Dictionary of
Occupational Titles published by the U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment and Training Administration. These titles are
assigned ratings of various work functions based on studies
conducted or funded by various branches of the government.

12.14
(5.06)

The complexity scale is constructed using the data, people, and
GED reasoning scores
Data Score

Represents the degree to which the occupation requires functions
with regards to data.

3.16
(1.95)

People Score

Represents the degree to which the occupation requires functions
with regards to people.

2.21
(2.1)

GED Reasoning
Score

General Education Development Scale for Reasoning
Development required for the occupation.

3.81
(1.06)

Things Score

Represents the degree to which the occupation requires functions
with regards to things.

2.24
(2.53)
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Formal Organizational Position
Based on Erik Wright’s (1978) model of social class including “contradictory
locations” based in ownership, supervision, and skills.
Employer size

How many people work for your employer at all locations? (1 =
1–9, 2 = 10–49, 3 = 50–99, 4 = 100–499, 5 = 500–999, 6 =
1000–1999, and 7 = 2000+) Note: Respondents were asked
directly, but these categories were offered if respondents did not
provide an estimate. This study recoded responses into
categories. In 12 percent of the cases the survey staff obtained
organization size through outside sources.

Organization
type

In your present job do you work for the government, a private
company, a not-for-profit organization, or are you selfemployed?

5.09
(1.94)

government

17.5%

a private company

71.7%

a not-for-profit organization

8.5%

self-employed

2.3%

Is a supervisor

In your job, do you supervise the work of other employees?
(Supervisor =1)

Number
supervised

How many people do you supervise directly or indirectly?

49.5%

5 or fewer employees

24.9%

6–20 employees

16.7%

More than 20 employees

8.0%

Skilled
occupation

Respondents were asked their job title and normal duties, which
were then coded into DOT Occupational Codes. For distribution
by occupational groups, see Table 1. Occupational averages
were obtained for eight skill related measures (SEI, DOT data
and people scores, average GED reasoning and math scores,
specific vocational preparation, average education for
occupation, and percent of occupation with college degree).
These were computed as z-scores and averaged into a skill scale,
which was recoded into a dichotomous variable for high (scale >
0) and low (scale <0) skilled worker.

36.1%

Formal
Organization
Position

1. Non-Autonomous Worker: not self-employed, nonsupervisory, does not work in a “skilled” occupation

37.2%

2. First Line Supervisor: not self-employed and supervises 5 or
fewer workers

14.2%
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3. Semi-Autonomous Worker: not self-employed, nonsupervisory or supervises 5 or fewer people, works in a
“skilled” occupation

23.0%

4. Lower Manager: not self-employed and supervises between
6 and 20 people

15.7%

5. Upper/Middle Manager: not self-employed and supervises
more than 20 people

7.6%

6. Large Employer/Capitalist: self-employed and employs 10
or more workers

2.3%

Work Outcomes
Wage levels

About how much will you earn from your main job this year?
Respondents who did not answer directly were asked a series of
questions that attempted to categorize wage levels into the
following: $0–4,999; $5,000–9,999; $10,000–14,999; $15,000–
19,999; $20,000–24,999; $25,000–29,999; $30,000–34,999;
$35,000–39,999; $40,000–44,999; $45,000–49,999; $50,000–
54,999; $55,000–59,999; $60,000–64,999; $65,000–69,999;
$70,000–74,999; and $75,000 or over. The IQES had a 96
percent response rate to this. All responses recoded into wage
categories.

Job satisfaction

Uses standard satisfaction responses:
1. All in all, how satisfied would you say you are with your job?
(1 = not at all satisfied, 2 = not too satisfied, 3 = somewhat
satisfied, 4 = very satisfied, and 5 = completely satisfied)
2. Please tell me how satisfied you are with your fringe
benefits.
3. How satisfied are you with your level of job security?
4. How satisfied are you with your coworkers?
5. How satisfied are you with your supervisors?
6. How satisfied are you with the technology you use on your
job?
7. How satisfied are you with your pay compared to people
who do work similar to yours for other employers?

7.04
(3.58)

3.91
(0.96)

Reliability  = .73
Worker identity Agreement with statements (standard responses):
(often viewed as 1. My work is the main part of who I am.
work
2. I have other activities more important than my work. (this
commitment)
was coded for disagreement as high values)
3. My main satisfaction in life comes from my work.
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2.71
(1.09)

Reliability  = .66

FIGURE 1: Apparent Distribution of Administrative Clan, Conventional Core, and
Informal Periphery among Floors at Site of Case Study
FIGURE 2: Measurement Model for Consent (Standardized Parameters)
FIGURE 3: Workplace Model that Includes the Effects of Informal Organization on Job
Rewards
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Fourth Floor: 10–15 Workers
Mostly Upper-Tier Primary Labor Market
Some executives, some upper-level managers,
some highly skilled professionals,
some upper-status clerical, few lower-status clerical

Third Floor: 30–40 Workers
Mostly Upper-Tier Primary Labor Market
Some managers, many professionals, some upper-status
clerical, some lower-status clerical
Accounting, Human Resources, MIS, Risk Management

Second Floor: 40–50 Workers
Mostly Lower-Tier Primary Labor Market
Few managers, few professionals, some upper-status
clerical, many lower-status clerical
Legal, Purchasing, Operations, Special Project Teams

First Floor: 100+ Workers
Mostly Secondary Labor Market
Few managers, few professionals,
few upper-status clerical, many lower-status clerical
Collections, Mail, Records, Reception

Administrative
Clan

Conventional
Core

Extended
Periphery

.59
1
da1

idecide

Autonomy

2.11

.22
da2 1

lotofsay

.27
1
ds1

sayhours

.26
1
ds2

saydays

.26
1
ds3

1.00

1

1.00
1.14
1.00
saytime

workhard

.56
1
dc2
myvalues
.21
1
dc3
iamproud

.70

.23
zs

.20
SchedFlex

.64

1.00

.86
1
dp
partdecs
.34
1
dc1

.04
za
1

.09
zc
1.00
1.67

1
OrgComm

1.68

Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Chi-square = 30.556
Degrees of freedom = 24
Probability level = .167
N = 560

.54

Consent

Organizational
Characteristics
Organization Size
Organization Scope
Not-for-Profit
Government
Industry Concentration
Individual
Characteristics
Gender
Race
Age
Education
Marital Status
Formal Position and
Job Characteristics
Technological Change
Part-time Work
Hours at Other Jobs
Hours Worked at Home
Tenure with Organization
Substantive Complexity
Occupational Skill
Union Membership
Formal Structure Position
(i.e., Wright’s Class)

Employer Offers
Autonomy
Schedule Flexibility
Participation in Decisions
Informal Position
Consent Deal
Employee
Offers
Organizational
Commitment

Job Attitudes
Job is Meaningful
Job Satisfaction
Job Entitlement
Union Effectiveness
Job Perceptions
Pay Equity
Promotion Equity
Job Discrimination
Relations with Supervisors
Relations with Coworkers
Job Behaviors
Work Commitment (Identity)
Avg. Hours Worked/Week
Job Outcomes
Wages
Expectation of Promotion
Job Stress
Self Estrangement
Perceived Social Class

